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This paper evaluates the effect of U.S. state corporate income taxes on union wages.  American workers
who belong to unions are paid more than their non-union counterparts, and this difference is greater
in low-tax locations, reflecting that unions and employers share tax savings associated with low tax
rates.  In 2000 the difference between average union and non-union hourly wages was $1.88 greater
in states with corporate tax rates below four percent than in states with tax rates of nine percent and
above.  Controlling for observable worker characteristics, a one percent lower state tax rate is associated
with a 0.36 percent higher union wage premium, suggesting that workers in a fully unionized firm
capture roughly 54 percent of the benefits of low tax rates.
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There is lively debate over just who bears what part of the corporate tax burden.  The 
simple fact that corporate tax payments are remitted by corporations is an institutional detail that 
carries no implication for the ultimate incidence of these taxes, since in a competitive market the 
forces of demand and supply determine the extent to which corporate tax burdens are shifted 
onto workers in the form of lower wages or are absorbed by capital owners in the form of 
reduced returns.  Empirical investigation has the potential to identify the effect of corporate taxes 
on wages and returns to capital owners, but in practice faces daunting challenges in attempting to 
establish what wages and investment returns would have been in the absence of taxation. 
Economic theory indicates that the incidence of a corporate tax in a competitive market is 
determined by the effect of the tax on marginal incentives.  High rates of corporate income 
taxation discourage business activity by reducing returns to investment.  As a result, high tax 
rates generally depress demand for capital and labor, thereby reducing the returns earned by 
workers and capital owners.  Hence the distribution of corporate tax burdens between labor and 
capital is a function of demand and supply in relevant markets. 
In settings in which some firms earn economic rents that they may share with employees 
and other stakeholders, high corporate income taxes affect the distribution of economic returns 
not only by influencing marginal incentives but also by reducing the total volume of economic 
rents available to be shared.  This process is most evident in the case of firms with unionized 
workforces.  Firm profitability affects the terms of negotiated agreements between unions and 
employers, and high tax rates generally reduce this profitability.  As a result, high taxes can be 
expected to reduce the wages earned by unionized workers, and thereby reduce the difference 
between union wages and non-union wages. 
This paper analyzes the rent sharing aspect of corporate tax incidence by considering the 
extent to which unionized workers bear the burden of corporate income taxes in the form of 
reduced wages.  Specifically, the paper estimates the impact of U.S. state corporate income tax 
rates on differences between union wages and non-union wages in 2000.  The evidence points to 
substantial tax effects: the average gap between union and non-union hourly wages is $1.88 
higher in the lowest-tax states than in the highest-tax U.S. states.  This difference persists in   2
regressions controlling for observable worker and firm characteristics, and is greater for wages in 
capital-intensive industries, which are the most heavily impacted by high rates of corporate 
income taxation.  Distinguishing states by those with and without right-to-work laws, the effect 
of corporate taxes on union wages appears to be stronger in those without right-to-work laws, 
where unions have more power, and where their ability to extract rents from profitable firms is 
correspondingly greater. 
One aspect of examining union wage premiums rather than wage levels is that state-
specific factors, such as local cost of living differences and unmeasured characteristics of local 
labor or local firms, do not influence the resulting estimates as long as they affect union and non-
union wages equally.  The evidence suggests that, among firms earning economic rents that can 
be shared with unions, the costs of corporate taxation are likewise shared with unions. The 
estimates imply that if a firm’s workforce is entirely unionized, then roughly 54 percent of the 
cost of higher tax rates is borne by union members in the form of lower wages.  The paper does 
not directly estimate the impact of corporate taxes on non-union wages, though the estimates 
may carry implications for the part of labor compensation that represents rent-sharing, including 
any rent-sharing outside of collective bargaining agreements. 
The second section of the paper discusses the incidence of corporate taxes and the effects 
of unionization on wages.  The third section presents a framework for empirical estimation of the 
effects of corporate taxation on union wages.  The fourth section describes the data, and the fifth 
section presents the results of estimating the determinants of union wage premiums.  The sixth 
section considers issues presented by multijurisdictional firms, and the seventh section is the 
conclusion. 
2.  Corporate Tax Incidence and the Determinants of Union Wages 
The effect of corporate income taxes on factor returns depends on the impact of taxes on 
factor demands and the extent to which firms share after-tax rents with workers.  The modern 
general equilibrium treatment of corporate tax incidence began with Harberger’s (1962) study 
that identifies the possibility that labor might bear the burden of corporate taxes, yet estimates 
that in practice corporate and non-corporate capital together bear roughly the entire burden of a 
corporate tax in a closed economy.  Gravelle and Kotlikoff (1993) add product differentiation to   3
the closed economy model, finding that capital continues to bear approximately the entire burden 
of the tax.  These models take markets to be perfectly competitive, from which it follows that 
labor is paid its marginal product without any opportunity for a premium. 
In economies that are open to international trade and capital flows there is less scope for 
capital to bear the burden of corporate taxes, since domestic capital must earn the after-tax rate 
of return available elsewhere or else it is apt to flee.  As a result, high tax rates are likely to be 
associated with high pretax rates of return and correspondingly reduced capital investment, 
which depresses labor productivity and therefore wages, effectively shifting the burden of 
corporate taxes onto labor.  Several recent studies suggest that labor bears a substantial portion of 
the corporate tax burden in open economies.  Revisiting the incidence of the corporate tax with 
an open economy model, Harberger (1995) finds that the burden of a corporate tax can be more 
than fully shifted onto labor in the form of lower real wages.  Using a simple general equilibrium 
model, Randolph (2006) reports that labor bears 70 percent of the U.S. corporate income tax 
burden in a model in which the worldwide capital stock is fixed and the United States accounts 
for 30 percent of world capital.  Gravelle and Smetters (2006) show that labor may bear less than 
70 percent of the corporate tax burden in a model in which international trade and capital flows 
are impeded by imperfect substitutability of products produced in different countries, thereby 
rendering the economy effectively less open. 
Several recent empirical studies estimate the effect of national corporate taxes on wages.
1 
Hassett and Mathur (2006) analyze data on average manufacturing wages in 72 countries from 
1981-2002, reporting that one percent higher statutory corporate tax rates are associated with one 
percent lower wages.  Felix (2007) analyzes survey data for 19 countries from 1979-2002, 
finding that one percent higher corporate tax rates are associated with 0.7 percent lower wages 
after controlling for observable worker characteristics.  Arulampalam, Devereux and Maffini 
(2007) use company-level European data to estimate the wage effects of tax burdens that differ 
between firms; they report that firms with greater tax obligations pay lower wages, the estimates 
implying that labor bears close to 100 percent of the corporate tax burden in the long run.  Desai, 
Foley and Hines (2007) use data on U.S. outbound investment between 1989-2004 to estimate 
                                                 
1 Auerbach (2006) and Gentry (2007) offer thoughtful surveys of recent contributions to the literature on corporate 
tax incidence.   4
the effects of taxation on local wages and capital returns, constraining the effects to sum to total 
tax burdens; the results imply that local labor bears between 45-75 percent of the corporate tax 
burden.  Each of these studies uses different data and methodologies, yet all conclude that labor 
bears a substantial burden of the national corporate tax.
2 
Studies of state corporate taxes likewise point to the conclusion that much of the 
corporate tax burden is borne by labor.  Mieskowski and Zodrow (1985) note that, in theory, a 
higher corporate tax should induce capital flight, thereby reducing wages in the state imposing 
higher taxes and increasing wages elsewhere.
3  McLure (1981) considers the impact of formulas 
used by states to apportion income for tax purposes, hypothesizing that the tax burden from the 
part of income apportioned according to labor expenses will be borne by immobile labor in the 
form of lower real wages.  Using 1980 data on wages from 125 U.S. cities, Gyourko and Tracy 
(1989) estimate that one percent higher state corporate tax rates are associated with one percent 
lower wages.  Using data from 1977 to 2005, Felix (2009) finds a smaller effect: a one percent 
increase in the state corporate tax rate is estimated to lower wages between 0.14 and 0.36 
percent, though the magnitude of this effect appears to have increased over this sample period.  
Although the empirical literature consistently finds a negative relationship between 
corporate tax rates and wages, the need to identify what wages would have been in the absence 
of taxation poses an important challenge in attempting to isolate the effect of corporate taxes on 
wages.  Observed wages reflect many local economic and labor conditions, some of which are 
inevitably unmeasured and therefore omitted from explanatory variables included in empirical 
specifications.  To the extent that important omitted variables are correlated with corporate tax 
rates, there is the potential for bias and therefore misleading inference.  In the U.S. state context, 
if union and non-union workers are similarly affected by important omitted state-specific 
characteristics, then in comparing how their labor market outcomes are affected by taxation it 
may be possible to avoid this source of potential bias. 
                                                 
2 Riedel (2007) offers a rather different answer based on an analysis of the determinants of wages in multinational 
firms located in 15 European countries from 1996-2005.  She reports that 10 percent higher tax rates are associated 
with 4 percent higher local wages and 1 percent lower wages paid by the same firms in other countries, attributing 
the difference to the incentive to incur deductible labor expenses in places where tax rates are high. 
3 Mieszkowski and Zodrow also find that state corporate taxes lower the return to capital in both taxing and non-
taxing states. Consumers in the taxing state face higher prices as a result of corporate taxes but this is offset by the 
lower prices faced in non-taxing states.   5
In comparing the wages of union and non-union workers it is helpful to understand the 
sources of apparent union wage premiums.  Freeman and Medoff (1984) report that relatively 
high union wages reflect both the ability of unions to exploit their bargaining positions with 
employers and the role of union organizational practices in contributing to labor productivity.  
Cross-sectional evidence consistently shows union workers to earn higher wages than apparently 
comparable non-union workers, though the problems posed in accurately identifying relevant 
worker characteristics are responsible for estimated union wage premiums that vary between 30 
percent and zero.
4  The study by Hirsch (2004) uses an estimation approach that is typical of the 
older literature, analyzing cross-sectional data from the U.S. Current Population Survey to 
measure the extent to which unionization and various worker characteristics influence wages.  
Hirsch argues that earnings imputations and union status misclassifications biased downward 
previous estimates of union wage premiums; after correcting for these two problems, Hirsch 
reports a union wage premium of 24 percent.  DiNardo and Lee (2004) use a regression 
discontinuity approach to compare wages in firms where unions barely won certification 
elections to wages in firms where unions barely lost certification elections.  DiNardo and Lee 
report very little difference between wages in these two cases, suggesting that unions have little 
effect on wages and implying that the cross-sectional evidence of significant union wage 
premiums might reflect unmeasured worker heterogeneity in which union workers would have 
commanded higher wages even without unions.  The literature’s modal interpretation of the 
evidence is that the true union premium probably lies somewhere between these two extremes, 
near 15 percent (Hirsch 2004). 
Unions are able to command wage premiums for their members only in circumstances in 
which employers have rents that can be shared with workers.  There is ample evidence that union 
wage premiums are higher in more profitable firms, and moreover, that firm and industry 
profitability is also positively correlated with wages for non-unionized workers, suggesting that 
there is an important rent-sharing component to market wages.
5  Corporate executive 
                                                 
4 Lewis (1986) offers a detailed review of the early union wage gap literature, and Belman and Voos (2004) provide 
a treatment of more recent contributions. 
5 Svejnar (1986), Currie and McConnell (1992) and Abowd and Lemieux (1993) offer evidence that union wages are 
higher in more profitable firms, and Christofides and Oswald (1992) and Budd and Slaughter (2004) similarly find 
that union wages are higher in more profitable industries.  Interindustry wage studies (e.g., Dickens and Katz, 1987; 
Krueger and Summers, 1987, 1988; Katz and Summers, 1989; Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey, 1996) consistently   6
compensation typically includes a substantial and explicit rent-sharing component (e.g., Hall and 
Liebman, 1998) designed to align the incentives of managers with the interests of shareholders.  
Consequently union wages represent just one of potentially many channels through which 
owners of firms share their rents with other stakeholders. 
The apparent union wage premium peaked in 1984 and subsequently trended downward 
(Blanchflower and Bryson, 2004).
6  Hirsch, Macpherson and Schumacher (2002) examine 
factors contributing to the decline in union wage premiums between 1986 and 2001, finding that 
46 percent of the decline is due to changes in the union wage gap, 16 percent is due to changes in 
worker characteristics and 38 percent is due to sectoral shifts in employment.  Belman and Voos 
(2004) offer evidence that the decline in union wage premiums varied across industries, and that 
the union wage premium actually increased in 11 (of 78) industries between the late 1970s and 
mid 1990s.  Bratsberg and Ragan (2002) find that differences in union wage premiums between 
industries have fallen over time. 
There is considerable evidence (e.g., Clark, 1984) that firms with unionized workforces 
earn lower investment returns than other firms, which is consistent with the apparent effect of 
unions in raising wages and thereby extracting some of the rents that would otherwise go to 
investors.  Lee and Mas (2009) report that stock prices of newly unionized firms fall an average 
of 10 percent over the following 18 months, and that union vote shares in certification elections 
are negatively correlated with subsequent stock returns.
7  Combining the corporate tax incidence 
literature with the union literature suggests that state corporate taxes may affect union workers in 
two ways: by decreasing the wages of all workers and by lowering union wage premiums. This 
second effect occurs as corporate taxes reduce firm profitability which in turn leaves unions and 
firms with less to share. 
3.  Corporate Taxes and Wages 
                                                                                                                                                             
report that wages are higher in more profitable industries, and firm-level evidence (e.g., Hildreth and Oswald, 1997, 
and Budd, Konings and Slaughter, 2005) indicates that wages are higher in more profitable firms. 
6 Blanchflower and Bryson examine estimates between 1973 and 2002. Estimates of the union wage premium seem 
to have increased in 2001 and 2002, but it is still early to know if this trend will continue. 
7 Lee and Mas use a regression discontinuity method similar to that employed by DiNardo and Lee. They reconcile 
the apparent difference in findings by noting that the effect of unionization on stock returns might depend on how 
aggressively firms and unions court voters in certification elections.   7
In order to estimate the impact of corporate taxes on union wages it is helpful to specify a 
model of the firm that incorporates union wage determination.  Since labor expenses are 
deductible in calculating taxable income, that portion of a firm’s rents that are shared with unions 
is not directly impacted by high tax rates.  This tax treatment, in turn, has the potential to affect 
the kind of bargain that firms strike with unions, so it is very useful to identify the source of any 
tax effects on union wage premiums. 
Consider the case in which a corporation produces output with a production 
function () L K Q , , in which K denotes capital inputs and L denotes labor inputs.  The 
specification of  () L K Q ,  includes the possibility that the corporation has market power and 
therefore sells output at a price above cost; the associated rents are captured in a higher value of 
() L K Q , .  The market wage is w, but unionized workers in the firm have the potential to earn 
compensation that exceeds market wages.  R denotes the aggregate amount by which labor 
compensation exceeds reservation wages, so the firm’s total labor cost equals R wL + .  The 
corporation is entirely equity financed with capital that is capable of earning an after-tax rate of 
return of r if deployed elsewhere.  Profits are subject to tax at rateτ . 
Owners of the corporation receive economic rents on their investment denotedρ , where: 
(1)      () ( ) [ ] rK R wL L K Q − − − − = , 1 τ ρ . 
In expression (1) firms are not entitled to deduct the opportunity cost of capital from their taxable 
incomes, which is why taxation influences their capital input decisions.  Owners of the firm 
choose K and L to maximize the value ofρ , subject to any constraints imposed by union 
bargaining, in particular the determination of R. 
  It is useful first to consider the case in which the firm negotiates with its union over the 
magnitude of R independent of the firm’s total employment.  In a standard Nash bargaining setup 
(see, e.g., Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004, pp. 382-390), the negotiation chooses R to maximizeψ , 
in which: 
(2)     ( ) ( ) [ ] { }
α α α α τ ρ ψ
− − − − − − = =
1 1 , 1 rK R wL L K Q R R .   8
The condition 0 =
dR
dψ
 implies that: 






















wL L K Q R . 
  High tax rates reduce the profits available to distribute to capital owners, whereas rents 
allocated to labor unions are deductible in calculating taxable income and therefore not directly 
affected by high tax rates.  The deductibility of labor expenses reduces the cost of distributing 
rents to union members relative to distributing rents to capital owners, but equation (4) indicates 
that despite this relative price effect higher taxes reduce union rents by depressing after-tax 
returns.   Equation (4) implies that union rents as a fraction of total labor compensation can be 
expressed as: 
















  In order to evaluate (5) it is helpful to incorporate the standard effects of high tax rates in 
increasing the cost of capital and thereby depressing capital demand, which does not apply to the 
cost of labor.  The firm’s first-order conditions with respect to choices of K and L are given by 
differentiating (1), producing: 

















Consider the case in which the firm earns inframarginal rents but its production function can be 
approximated by a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas function: 
( 7 )        ( )
γ γ − =
1 , L aK L K Q .   9
This production function together with the first order condition (6) implies that factor demands 


























.  Applying these conditions to (5) 
produces: 


































Expression (8) indicates that union rents as a fraction of total labor compensation is a scalar 
function of α , the union’s bargaining power, and a declining function of τ , conditional on w.  
One complication in interpreting (8) is that w is potentially a function ofτ  , since in a 
competitive environment higher profit tax rates generally depress wages.  Equation (8) implies 
that: 
(9)   () () () () ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣


































2 1 . 
Equation (9) indicates that a higher tax rate reduces the union wage premium (measured as a 
fraction of total compensation) if the elasticity of wages with respect to one minus the tax rate is 












  How responsive should wages be to corporate tax rates?  Consider the case in which the 
supply of corporate capital is perfectly elastic at the after-tax rate of return r, and (taxed) 
corporations are the only demanders of labor.  Corporations earning an after-tax return of r must 
have pretax profits equal to  () τ − 1
rK




.  Their labor costs 
are wL.  In order to maintain a positive supply of corporate capital, given its infinite supply 
elasticity, total costs (at unchanging factor demands) must not change as tax rates change, which 
requires that:   10
(10)      
()







Equation (10) characterizes the extent to which wages would need to fall in order to 
prevent taxed corporations from incurring greater total costs as tax rates rise.  Since this 
condition reflects aggregate economic conditions, and not the features of a single firm, the 










, where γ  is the relevant average value ofγ , the share of capital in 
output.  Making this substitution, it follows that (10) implies: 









In evaluating (9), it is useful to replace
τ d
dw







, in which 1 0 ≤ ≤ μ  reflects the 
extent to which average wage declines offset the cost of tax increases for taxable 
corporations: 1 = μ  corresponds to a complete offset, whereas 0 = μ  corresponds to no 
compensating change in wages.  Then (9) becomes: 


























































: in a setting in which 
corporate taxes do not reduce profits, they also do not influence the fraction by which union 
wages exceed market wages.  For firms in industries in which the labor share exceeds the 
economy average, higher taxes even increase the union premium measured as a fraction of 
market wages, assuming that labor bears the full cost of corporate income taxes.   11
















w 1 .  
Taking the union wage premium to be modest, it follows from a first-order approximation that 
the log of the union wage is given by: 



















⎛ + ln 1 ln ln ln . 
An individual’s wage is determined by: 
( 1 4 )         u X w + = 1 ln β , 
in which X is a vector of individual, occupational, and potentially state characteristics, and u is a 
residual.  The union premium is given by: 
(15)       ε τ β β + + = X X
wL
R
3 2 , 
in which  3 β  reflects the impact of using mean values of the variables appearing on the right side 
of equation (12) – other than the employer’s capital intensity, which is the element of X that 
varies in this expression.  It follows from equations (13)-(15) that an individual’s observed wage 
is given by: 
(16)      () ( ) ε τ β β β D u X D X D
L
R





⎛ + 3 2 1 ln , 
in which D is a dummy variable taking the value one for a union worker and zero otherwise.  The 
empirical work described in section 5 estimates variants of equation (16). 
4.  Current Population Survey Data for 2000 
The empirical work in section 5 considers the determinants of wages in 2000, a recent 
year at the end of a long economic expansion, for which there are copious data on wages of 
union members and nonmembers.  Individual-level data for 2000 are available in the Outgoing   12
Rotation Group public use sample from the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS).
8  The 
CPS data are widely used in union wage studies because they provide individual-level 
information on both union status and wages.  The entire 2000 sample contains data on more than 
280,000 individuals, though cleaning and restricting the data for analysis leaves 57,426 
individual records.  The sample is restricted to full-time private sector workers between ages 20 
and 65, inclusive, and excludes students, self-employed individuals, and those who work in 
agriculture. 
  The goal of the analysis is to understand the determinants of the hourly wage rate, which 
is calculated by dividing weekly earnings by usual hours worked per week.  As displayed in 
Table 1, the median hourly wage is $13.54.  The CPS imputes earnings for about 30 percent of 
the sample.  As Hirsch (2004) shows, including individuals with imputed earnings leads to a 
downward biased estimate of the union wage gap.  Using 2001 data, Hirsch finds that excluding 
individuals with imputed earnings increases the union wage gap estimate by five percentage 
points.  Consequently, individuals with imputed earnings are excluded from the analysis, as are 
individuals who report earning less than $5.00 per hour, reflecting (with allowance for rounding 
error in reporting) the federal minimum wage of $5.15. In addition, the CPS assigns a top code to 
weekly earnings over a specified value. Following the rule-of-thumb as described by Burkhauser, 
Feng and Jenkins (2009), top coded earnings are assigned a value equal to 150 percent of the top 
code value in the analysis. 
  Another important individual variable is union status.  An individual is classified as a 
union member if they identify themselves as a union member or if they are covered by a union 
contract.  Eleven percent of individuals in the sample are union members, and as expected, union 
members on average earn more than non-union members.  The median wage is $16.25 for union 
members and $13.06 for non-union members.  Union members are older than non-union 
members, and a higher percentage of union members are male. 
                                                 
8 The Current Population Survey is a monthly household survey that started in 1968. Households are interviewed in 
four consecutive months, ignored for eight months and then interviewed again the next four months. Each household 
is asked about union status and weekly earnings during their fourth and eighth interview. Therefore, we restrict our 
sample to these interviews which are termed the “Outgoing Rotation Group”. The National Bureau of Economic 
Research (2000) provides extracts of the CPS data that include only individuals in these outgoing rotation groups.   13
  The CPS data include several demographic characteristics that are typically correlated 
with wages.  The regressions that follow include controls for age, age-squared, gender, race, 
marital status, and years of education.  The regressions also include dummy variables for 
residence in a metropolitan area, employment by a non-profit firm, occupation dummies, and in 
some specifications industry dummies.  Occupation dummies are defined using a 2-digit detail 
occupation recode provided by NBER (2000) based on the 2000 Census occupation codes; the 
sample includes 22 occupations.
9 Industry dummies are based on an NBER (2000) created 2-
digit NAICS-based detailed industry classification code, and distinguish 46 industries.
10 
  The analysis focuses on the effect of state corporate taxes, using the highest marginal 
state corporate tax rate and adjusting for deductibility of federal corporate taxes.
11  The mean 
state corporate tax rate is 6.3 percent.  Some of the analysis that follows compares labor market 
outcomes in states with very low taxes from outcomes in states with very high taxes, where low-
tax states are those with top marginal corporate income tax rates of four percent or lower, and 
high-tax states are those with tax rates greater than or equal to nine percent.  The top marginal 
state personal income tax rate and the general sales tax rate are also frequently included as 
controls.  The CPS data do not indicate state of employment, so tax rates are attributed according 
to state of residence, which introduces some measurement error in cases in which people live in 
one state and work in another. 
  Right-to-work laws have the potential to influence union bargaining outcomes by 
permitting those who are not union members to work in unionized firms; right-to-work laws are 
generally thought to weaken the power of labor unions.  In 2000, 21 states had right-to-work 
laws (United States Department of Labor, 2009). 
  Theory predicts that an employer’s labor-to-capital ratio influences any tax effects on 
union wages, since corporate taxes are more burdensome in capital-intensive industries.  Industry 
                                                 
9 There are a total of 23 occupations in the data, but the private sector restriction excludes those who work for the 
armed forces. 
10 There are 50 industries in the dataset in 2000, but those who work in agriculture, private households, public 
administration and armed services are excluded from the sample. 
11 The highest marginal corporate tax rate is available from several sources including the Tax Foundation (2009) and 
the World Tax Database from the Office of Tax Policy Research (2009).  In 2000, five states allowed complete or 
partial deductions for federal corporate taxes; the state tax rate is correspondingly adjusted following the formula 
provided in Chirinko and Wilson (2008).   14
labor-to-capital ratios are calculated from tax return data reported by the Internal Revenue 
Service (2000) by dividing salary and wages by total assets.  This measure varies by industry and 
ranges from a low of 0.01 in the management of companies and enterprises industry to a high of 
0.87 in the health care services (excluding hospitals) industry.  
5.  Evidence on Corporate Taxes and Union Wages in 2000 
  A first pass at the CPS evidence reveals a strong negative association between state 
corporate tax rates and union wage premiums.  Figure 1 depicts median hourly wages for four 
samples of workers: unionized and non-unionized workers living in two groups of states: those 
with very high tax rates and those with very low tax rates.  For this purpose, high-tax states are 
those with corporate tax rates of nine percent and higher, whereas low-tax states are those with 
corporate tax rates of four percent or lower.  As the figure illustrates, the difference between 
median wages of union members and non-union members is significantly larger in low-tax states 
than is the same difference in high-tax states.  A similar difference appears when mean wages are 
used in place of median wages, as is apparent in the underlying data reported in Appendix Table 
A1. 
  The theory sketched in section 3 predicts not only that union wage premiums should be 
higher in low-tax states, but that the effect of taxation should be most pronounced among 
workers whose firms have low ratios of labor-to-capital. This is entirely sensible, since the 
corporate tax is a tax on capital, and therefore most heavily impacts firms for which capital costs 
represent higher fractions of their total costs.  Figure 2 repeats the exercise depicted in Figure 1, 
this time first distinguishing workers by the labor-to-capital ratios of the industries in which they 
are employed.
12  The four leftmost bars in Figure 2 present median wages in industries with high 
labor-to-capital ratios: the difference between hourly union and non-union wages is substantial 
($2.54) in low-tax states, and nonexistent in high-tax states.  The four rightmost bars in Figure 2 
present median wages in industries with low labor-to-capital ratios.  In this comparison, the 
union wage premium is considerably larger in low-tax states than in high-tax states, the 
                                                 
12 Appendix Table A2 presents variable means and medians distinguished by state tax rates and industry labor-to-
capital ratios.  It is noteworthy that some of the union cells depicted in Figure 2 have small numbers of observations, 
so there may be considerable sampling variability in comparisons among these cells.   15
difference ($4.34) greatly exceeding the corresponding difference in industries with high labor-
to-capital ratios. 
Table 2 presents regressions that formalize the comparisons depicted in Figures 1 and 2, 
in the process controlling for observable worker attributes that plausibly affect their wages.  
Column I of Table 2 reports estimated coefficients from a regression in which log wage is the 
dependent variable; the independent variables include worker characteristics, 46 dummy 
variables (not reported) for employer industry, 22 occupation dummy variables, a dummy 
variable for non-profit employers, and a dummy variable for urban location.  Reported standard 
errors are bootstrapped (1,000 replications) and clustered at the state level to adjust for lack of 
independence among observations of workers in the same states.  The standard patterns appear in 
the coefficients reported in column I: wages are higher for union members, older workers 
(though the marginal effect of additional years declines with age), male workers, married male 
workers, Caucasian workers, those with greater years of education, and those in urban areas.   
The regression presented in column II of Table 2 removes the industry dummy variables 
and adds corporate tax rates, the interaction of union membership and corporate tax rates, 
industry labor-to-capital ratio, the interaction of industry labor-to-capital ratio and union 
membership, the interaction of industry labor-to-capital ratio, union membership, and the 
corporate tax rate, and state personal and sales tax rates.  The -1.1833 coefficient implies that 
high state corporate tax rates are associated with lower union wage premiums, while the 4.2198 
coefficient on the interaction of industry labor-to-capital ratio, union membership, and the 
corporate tax rate implies that the effect of corporate taxes on union wages is strongest in 
industries with low labor-to-capital ratios, as theory suggests it should be. 
Using the mean labor-to-capital ratio of 0.194 reported in Table 1, it follows from the 
coefficients reported in column II of Table 2 that a one percent higher state corporate tax rate 
(e.g., the difference between a seven percent tax rate and a six percent tax rate) is associated with 
roughly a 0.36 percent reduction in union wage premiums (1.1833 – 4.2198*0.194 = 0.3647).  In 
order to judge the magnitude of this effect it is helpful to use the most recent IRS data, covering 
tax year 2006, which indicate that U.S. corporations had $1,170 billion of taxable income, 
together with salary and wage expenses of $1,720 billion.  For a very large firm representing one   16
tenth of one percent of the corporate sector, a one percent increase in the corporate tax rate 
imposes a cost of $11.7 million.  If the firm’s workforce is entirely unionized, the aggregate 
union wage premium paid by the firm is estimated to fall by $6.27 million (0.003647*1,720 = 
6.27), offsetting 54 percent of the cost of the tax increase. 
Another way to gauge the significance of the tax effects reported in column II is to 
compare them to the estimated union effects.  Using mean values for the corporate tax rate 
(0.063) and the labor-to-capital ratio (0.194), union membership increases wages by 17.8 percent 
(0.3063 – 1.1833*0.063 – 0.5454*0.194 + 4.2198*0.194*0.063 = 0.178), which is almost 
identical to the 17.5 percent union wage effect estimated without tax and labor intensity variables 
and reported in column I.  It is possible to use the coefficients to determine the state tax rate at 
which union wage effects are estimated to disappear.  Again setting the labor-to-capital ratio 
equal to its mean value of 0.194, union wages are 20.0 percent higher than comparable non-
union wages in the absence of taxation (0.3063 – 0.5454*0.194 = 0.200), but then decline by 
0.365 percent for every additional one percent of state taxation (1.1833 – 4.2198*0.194), which 
implies that union wage effects disappear at a state tax rate of 55 percent (0.20/0.365 = 0.55).  
Such an extrapolation goes well beyond the range over which there are any relevant data (the 
highest state corporate tax rate during that period was 12 percent, and only 10.1 percent after 
adjusting for the deductibility of federal taxes), and therefore is somewhat conjectural, but it is 
nonetheless reasonable to expect that a firm facing a state corporate tax rate of 55 percent 
together with the U.S. federal corporate tax rate of 35 percent would have very few if any rents 
left to share with a unionized workforce. 
  Column III of Table 2 reports estimated coefficients from a regression that repeats the 
regression reported in column II, except that it does not include the state personal and sales tax 
rates as independent variables.  Omitting these variables has very little effect on the estimated 
coefficients of terms including union and tax interactions.  The regression reported in column IV 
includes 46 industry dummy variables (and therefore omits the industry labor-to-capital ratio).  
The estimated coefficients on interactions between union membership and corporate tax rates are 
somewhat smaller than their counterparts reported in column II, though they remain statistically 
significant and imply a tax effect on union wage premiums that is of almost identical magnitude 
when evaluated at mean labor-to-capital ratios.   17
  The regressions reported in Table 2 identify tax effects from cross-state differences in tax 
rates and within-state differences in capital intensities of different industries interacted with state 
tax rates.  Table 3 presents wage regressions that abstract entirely from cross-state level 
differences by including a complete set of state dummies as explanatory variables.  As a result, 
these regressions identify tax effects simply from differences in the impact of unionization, and 
unionization interacted with industry capital intensities, in states with differing corporate tax 
rates. 
  The first column of Table 3 presents estimated coefficients from a wage regression that 
includes state dummy variables but omits any tax terms.  The estimated effects of demographic 
variables including age, gender, marital status, race, and years of education are similar to those 
appearing in column I of Table 2, and the effect of union membership (15.4 percent higher 
wages) is only slightly smaller than that (17.5 percent) obtained without including state dummy 
variables.  Column II of Table 3 presents estimated coefficients from a regression corresponding 
to that presented in column II of Table 2, with the addition of 50 state dummy variables.  The 
estimated -0.8578 coefficient on the interaction of union membership and the corporate tax rate, 
and the estimated 3.5582 coefficient on the union membership and labor-to-capital ratio with the 
corporate tax rate, are only somewhat smaller than the corresponding coefficients reported in 
Table 2, though together they imply that one percent higher tax rates (evaluated at the mean 
labor-capital ratio of 0.194) are associated with a 0.1675 percent reduction in union wages.  
Repeating the same exercise as before, this implies that a fully unionized workforce receives 25 
percent of the benefits or costs of state tax rate changes. 
  The third column of Table 3 adds a complete set of industry dummy variables, which 
entails dropping the labor-to-capital ratio as an independent variable.  The estimated tax effects 
reported in column III are little more than half the magnitude of those reported in column II, 
though the impact of the interaction of union status, labor-to-capital ratio, and state corporate tax 
rate is at the borderline of statistical significance.  Appendix Table A3 presents estimated 
coefficients from regressions that do not include state dummy variables but instead include 
dummy variables for nine Census divisions of the country, thereby controlling for one aspect of 
geography while continuing to identify tax effects from cross-state variation.  The four   18
regressions reported in Appendix Table A3 present estimated tax coefficients that are only 
slightly smaller than the corresponding coefficients appearing in Table 2. 
The regressions in Tables 2 and 3 pool union members and other workers into the same 
sample for estimation purposes, imposing that the coefficients on other variables, such as age and 
education, are the same for the two groups.  Table 4 presents regressions that relax this 
requirement. 
The first two columns of Table 4 present regressions run separately for union members 
and other workers.  The -0.6706 and 4.3105 coefficients in the first column of Table 4 indicate 
that union workers in states with high corporate tax rates receive lower wages (though this effect 
by itself is statistically insignificant), and that this effect is attenuated for those who work in 
more labor-intensive industries.  The 0.6205 and 0.7422 coefficients in column II imply that a 
very different pattern appears among non-unionized workers.
13  Other regressors, such as age, 
gender, education and marital status, have similar coefficients in the regressions reported in 
columns I and II, with the magnitudes of the implied effects perhaps a bit smaller in the case of 
union workers.  The regression reported in column III pools the two samples and permits the 
coefficients on variables such as age and gender to vary by union status.  In this regression the -
1.3872 and 3.9811 coefficients again imply that union wage premiums are negatively affected by 
high corporate tax rates, particularly in industries with low labor intensity.  The estimated tax 
effects in this regression are larger than those implied by the regression in column II of Table 2, 
in which union members and non-union workers are constrained to have the same coefficients on 
other variables.  Appendix Table A4 repeats these regressions adding a complete set of industry 
dummies, reporting somewhat smaller estimated tax effects. 
The regressions reported in Tables 2-4 take the statutory corporate tax rate to be a 
measure of corporate tax burdens.  In fact, states differ not only in their statutory tax rates but 
also in many aspects of their tax bases.  These tax base differences are not easily categorized, 
and since tax burdens are clearly very heavily influenced by the readily measured statutory tax 
rates, the standard procedure of empirical researchers is to use statutory tax rate differences as 
indicators of relative tax burdens, understanding that these measures are likely to be imprecise.   19
Table 5 presents estimated coefficients from regressions that replace the statutory 
corporate tax rate with dummy variables indicating whether the statutory tax rate is nine percent 
or higher, or alternatively is less than four percent.  The idea behind this replacement is to use a 
tax measure that is a coarse function of statutory rates and that thereby captures significant 
differences in tax burdens between groups of states.  The estimated coefficients in the regression 
reported in the first column of Table 5 are consistent with those in Table 2 and elsewhere.  The -
0.0924 coefficient on the interaction of union membership and residence in a high-tax state 
indicates that union members earn lower wage premiums in high-tax states, whereas the 
(statistically insignificant) 0.0433 coefficient on the interaction of union membership and 
residence suggests that the opposite is the case for union members in states with very low tax 
rates.  The estimated effects of labor-to-capital ratios, interacted with union membership and tax 
rate dummy variables, are likewise consistent with earlier regression results.  The 0.0778 
coefficient indicates that high labor-to-capital ratios reduce the effect of high taxes on union 
wage premiums, and the -0.3264 coefficient indicates that the same is true in a comparison of 
very low-tax states and the excluded middle states with statutory tax rates between four percent 
and nine percent. 
Column II of Table 5 presents estimated coefficients from a regression in which the 
sample is restricted to residents of very high-tax states and very low-tax states; as a result, the 
sample size of 22,647 observations is significantly smaller than the sample of 57,426 
observations used to estimate the regression reported in column I.  The -0.1385 and 0.4161 
coefficients together indicate that union wage premiums in the highest-tax states are lower than 
they are in the lowest-tax states, and that this difference is more pronounced for workers in 
industries with low labor-to-capital ratios.  Evaluated at the mean labor-to-capital ratio of 0.194, 
the coefficients imply that the union wage premium is 5.8 percent lower (as a fraction of total 
earnings) in the highest-tax states than it is in the lowest-tax states (-0.1385 + 0.194*0.4161 = -
0.0578).  Hence significant tax effects on union wage premiums appear even when using a 
coarse transformation of statutory corporate tax rates to approximate tax burdens.  Appendix 
Table A5 repeats these regressions adding industry dummy variables, reporting somewhat 
smaller, though nonetheless significant, estimated tax effects. 
                                                                                                                                                             
13 In column II of Table 4 the interaction of the labor-to-capital ratio, union dummy and corporate tax rate is   20
U.S. states differ in their legal treatment of unions, the most noticeable difference being 
that in states with “right-to-work” laws it is not necessary to belong to a union in order to work 
for a firm whose workforce is unionized.  It is widely understood that right-to-work laws 
diminish the power of unions, and thereby potentially reduce wages generally.
14  From the 
standpoint of analyzing the determinants of union wage premiums, reduced union power in states 
with right-to-work laws should correspond to significantly smaller tax effects in these states. 
A first pass at the evidence is consistent with this prediction.  The four leftmost bars in 
Figure 3 present median wages for workers in states with right-to-work laws, distinguishing 
those in the highest-tax states and the lowest-tax states (observations for those in states with 
statutory tax rates between four and nine percent are excluded in constructing Figure 3).  The by 
now familiar pattern of higher union wage premiums in the lowest-tax states does not appear in 
states with right-to-work laws, very possibly reflecting the inability of unions in these states to 
extract any of the rents associated with low tax rates.  The four rightmost bars in Figure 3 present 
median wages for workers in states without right-to-work laws, and here there does appear to be 
a difference in wage premiums ($2.81 an hour, according to the figures in Appendix Table A6) 
between the lowest-tax states and the highest-tax states. 
Table 6 presents regressions that distinguish states by their right-to-work regimes. The 
first column of Table 6 presents estimated coefficients from a regression estimated using data 
from states with right-to-work laws.  The -0.0908 coefficient on the interaction of union 
membership and the corporate tax rate is small and not statistically different from zero.  The 
4.2074 coefficient in column I suggests that union wage premiums in industries with low labor-
to-capital ratios are less negatively affected by state tax rates, but this coefficient is also 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
                                                                                                                                                             
replaced by the interaction of the labor-to-capital ratio and the corporate tax rate. 
14 After reviewing the existing literature, Moore (1998) concludes that right-to-work laws have the effect of reducing 
unions’ organizing efforts and successes. It follows that right-to-work laws have led to a decline in unionization over 
the long-run. The evidence on the effects of right-to-work laws on wages is more mixed. According to Moore 
(1998), most empirical evidence suggests that right-to-work laws have no impact on wages. There are exceptions: 
Carroll (1983) and Garofalo and Malhotra (1992) report large negative effects of right-to-work laws on average 
wages of all workers. Farber (1984) finds that union wage premiums are slightly larger in states with right-to-work 
laws, interpreting this difference to reflect higher nonpecuniary costs incurred by workers who join unions in states 
with right-to-work laws.  As a result, these workers may earn higher union wage premiums but lower rents than their 
unionized counterparts in states without right-to-work laws.    21
The second column of Table 6 presents estimated coefficients from the same regression 
run on data for workers in states that do not have right-to-work laws.  The estimated -1.2574 
coefficient on the interaction of union membership and the corporate tax rate is sizable and 
statistically significant, as is the 4.0229 coefficient on the interaction of these variables and the 
labor-to-capital ratio.  Tax interactions clearly have much stronger effects on union wage 
premiums in data drawn from workers located in states without right-to-work laws, as should be 
expected from the impact of right-to-work laws on the ability of unions to demand a share of the 
tax savings in low-tax locations.  The regression reported in column III of Table 6 pools these 
data and includes interactions of the union terms with a dummy variable indicating whether a 
state has right-to-work laws.  The -1.1246 and 3.9625 coefficients in this column are quite 
consistent with the results reported in column II for states without right-to-work laws, as they 
indicate that in the absence of right-to-work laws union wage premiums are smaller in high-tax 
states and that this effect is most pronounced in industries with low labor-to-capital ratios.  The 
1.0282 coefficient on the interaction of the tax and union terms with a dummy variable for right-
to-work laws implies that the effect of corporate taxes on union wage premiums largely 
disappears for workers in states with right-to-work laws.  Appendix Table A7 repeats these 
regressions adding industry dummy variables, with very similar-looking results. 
Table 7 presents estimated coefficients from regressions that repeat the specifications 
reported in Table 6, this time adding state dummy variables, and thereby controlling for wage 
effects of individual states and their policies.  The estimated -1.0543 and 3.3553 coefficients 
appearing in column III of Table 7 are just slightly smaller than the corresponding coefficients in 
column III of Table 6, and imply larger tax effects on union wage premiums for firms with mean 
labor-to-capital ratios, thereby suggesting that the estimated tax effects in Table 6 reflect 
something other than general wage effects that differ across states. 
The evidence presented in Figure 3 and Tables 6 and 7 points strongly toward 
heterogeneous effects of taxation on union wage premiums, in which the effects of taxation 
greatly diminish in places where unions have reduced power due to the underlying legal regime.  
This consideration suggests that it could be important to include right-to-work laws as 
explanatory variables in the regressions reported in Table 2.  Table 8 presents estimated 
coefficients from additional specifications of the regressions appearing in columns II and IV of   22
Table 2, this time adding dummy variables for right-to-work laws, and, in the even-numbered 
columns, an interaction of this dummy variable and a dummy variable for union membership.  
As is evident from the table, the estimated tax effects are similar to the corresponding estimates 
that appear in Table 2.  Thus, despite the importance of right-to-work laws in affecting the 
influence of taxation on union wages, explicit treatment of this consideration does not change the 
prior pattern that union wage premiums are higher in states with low tax rates.  
6. Multijurisdictional  Firms 
The analysis to this point concerns the effects of corporate taxes on firms located entirely 
within individual states.  It is useful to consider how the analysis might be modified in cases in 
which firms span several states.  There are at least two potentially significant consequences of 
having operations in multiple states.  The first is that the taxation of multistate firms differs from 
the taxation of firms confined to single states: the amount of a multijurisdictional firm’s income 
taxed in each state is determined using formulas that apportion the firm’s national income based 
on the fraction of its sales, employment, and capital located in the state.  The second potential 
consequence of multistate operation is that labor bargains struck in one state might affect 
contract terms elsewhere. 
Firms with unitary operations in multiple states do not use separate accounting to 
determine how much taxable income is earned in each state; instead, they use simple formulas 
that apportion national income to a state based on the state’s fraction of total sales, employment 
and capital located within the state.
15  States differ in their reliance on alternative factors to 
apportion national income, and these components of the apportionment formulas interact with 
tax rates to create burdens that differ among states.  Some states apportion taxable income based 
one-third each on sales, employment, and capital, though more commonly half of the 
apportionment is based on the location of sales, one quarter on employment, and one quarter on 
capital – and other formulas are also used. 
                                                 
15 Operations are unitary only if they have sufficient connection to each other.  Thus, a national petroleum company 
with centralized management, procurement and distribution as well as service stations in all 50 states would use 
formulas to calculate its taxable income in each state, whereas a New Jersey electronics firm that also owns 
restaurants in Hawaii would not: that firm would pay tax on its electronics income to New Jersey, and its restaurant 
income to Hawaii.  Gordon and Wilson (1986), Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) and Anand and Sansing (2000) 
consider the effects of state apportionment formulas on factor demands and the resulting incentives for states to 
adopt differing formulary weights.   23
The use of formulary methods to apportion taxable income discourages firms from 
configuring their operations in ways that would attribute high levels of income to high-tax states.  
In particular, there is a tax cost associated with paying high union wage premiums in high-tax 
states whose apportionment formulas place significant weight on labor factors, since the labor 
portion of the apportionment formula assigns taxable income based on labor compensation, 
inclusive of union premiums.  A high union premium therefore has the effect of attributing 
greater taxable income to the state, which is costly to the extent that the state has a high 
corporate tax rate.  As a result, bargaining between employers and unions will tend to produce 
smaller union premiums in states with high tax rates and significant labor shares in 
apportionment formulas, and this is in addition to the effect of high tax rates (together with the 
interaction of factor weights in apportionment formulas and the location of sales, employment, 
and capital) in reducing the surplus available to distribute to union members.  The Appendix 
amends the model of section 3 to consider the implications for a firm with unitary operations 
distributed across 50 states, and whose state tax obligations are therefore determined by 
formulas, concluding that the relevant state tax variable becomes the product of the state tax rate 
and one minus the sales share in the apportionment formula. 
It is not known what fraction of corporate income is earned by firms with unitary 
multistate operations whose state taxes are therefore determined by formulary apportionment.  In 
the extreme case in which all firms are subject to formulary apportionment, it is appropriate to 
modify the state tax variable in the regressions by multiplying it by one minus the sales factor 
weight.  Table 9 presents the results of re-running the regressions reported in columns II-IV of 
Table 2 using this modified tax variable.  The results of the two specifications are very similar, 
though the estimated tax effects reported in Table 9 are larger in magnitude than the 
corresponding effects in Table 2, reflecting that the modified tax variable has a smaller mean due 
to the sales factor adjustment.  The -1.5953 coefficient reported in column I indicates that higher 
state corporate tax rates (adjusted for sales apportionment) are associated with lower union wage 
premiums, and the 6.2956 coefficient indicates that this effect is most pronounced in industries 
with low labor-to-capital ratios.  Columns II and III report estimated coefficients from 
regressions that omit personal and sales taxes, and add industry dummy variables, without 
changing the qualitative nature of the results.  Consequently the empirical pattern evident in the   24
Table 2 regressions likewise appears when using a tax variable modified for firms with state tax 
obligations determined by formulary apportionment. 
Firms with operations in multiple states may have national unions that demand common 
compensation packages despite differences across states in costs of living, workforce 
characteristics, and state taxes.  Strict adherence to common contracts should have the effect of 
reducing, or for some firms eliminating, the impact of state taxes on local union wage premiums.   
Multistate firms whose employment is concentrated in individual states are likely to offer union 
contracts that reflect those states’ tax features, and the employee data will reflect that pattern, 
since the bulk of the observations of a firm’s employment will be those of employees whose state 
of residence matches the state whose tax policies influence wages the most.  Furthermore, firms 
facing such national contracts have incentives to undo their effects with selective hiring, 
choosing to employ only those workers generating the most surplus in states where the 
associated after-tax cost is the highest, and more generally choosing to concentrate operations in 
states where the common employment contract restriction is least burdensome.  Thus, while the 
existence of national union contracts will mitigate the impact of state taxes on local union wage 
premiums in some cases, the ability of employers to choose their locations and their employees, 
together with the natural concentration of firm activity in individual states, implies that there 
should remain a significant effect of state taxes on local union wage premiums. 
7. Conclusion 
High corporate income taxes reduce the after-tax profits of firms earning rents, which are 
the same firms that are in positions to pay above-market wages to their employees.  Since high 
taxes mean that there is less for everyone, it can hardly be surprising that high taxes ultimately 
depress union wages, particularly in capital-intensive industries where corporate taxes have the 
most impact on a firm’s bottom line. 
The evidence that high tax rates reduce union wage premiums does not directly address 
the impact of corporate taxes on wages for the majority of U.S. workers who are not union 
members.  In the case of perfectly competitive labor markets, the incidence of the corporate tax 
depends on how the tax affects demand for labor, which in turn is a function of the effects of 
taxation on labor-capital substitution and the reallocation of economic activity between sectors of   25
the economy.  But to the extent that there is a rent-sharing aspect of wages in settings without 
labor unions, it may be reasonable to expect that the same dynamics would appear, in that higher 
taxes would be associated with reduced wages.  A similar process could apply to executive 
compensation, rent and royalty payments, and any other firm expenses that plausibly include 
sharing of economic rents.  Consequently, the inframarginal burden of the corporate income tax 
may be shared among a number of a corporation’s stakeholders, thereby distributing corporate 
tax burdens among the parties who normally benefit from surplus produced within the firm. 
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Appendix 
This appendix analyzes the implications of formulary apportionment of state corporate 
tax rates for the specification of possible tax effects on union wage premiums. 
Suppose that a firm has unitary operations in more than one state.  The firm’s tax 
obligation to state i is then: 








































s R wL L K Q
1 1 1
1 , τ , 
in which the first bracketed term of (A1) represents the firm’s total U.S. taxable profits, while the 
second bracketed term represents the product of the portion of those profits taxed by state i and 
state i’s tax rate.  i s  is the labor expense weight in state i’s three-factor formula,  i s  is the capital 
share weight, and () i i s s − − 1  is therefore the sales weight; Li denotes the number of workers the 
firm employs in state i, and  i w  the wages non-union workers are paid in state i, Ri represents 
total union premiums in state i, Ki is the firm’s capital stock in state i, and  i S  denotes total firm 
sales in state i.  For simplicity we take the location of final sales to be unaffected by the location 
of production.  The firm’s total tax obligation to all states is the sum of tax obligations in all 
states in which the firm has nexus, and this can be defined as  ( ) [ ]τ R wL L K Q − − , , in which τ  is 
the average state tax rate, weighted by apportionment weights and the extent of firm activity in a 
state, as reflected in the second bracketed term of (A1). 
The tax consequences of operations in state i need not equal a firm’s tax obligation to 
state i, since operations in i affect the firm’s tax obligations to all states as determined by the 
apportionment formulas.  The analysis that follows assumes that the union and the firm negotiate 
over the allocation of rents arising from operations in state i, including the tax consequences of 
these operations.  Denoting the tax consequences as  i Tax , and firm rents arising from operations 
in state i by  i ρ , the analogue to equation (2) becomes:   31
(A2)     ( ) [ ]
α α α αρ ψ
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τ  denote the average value of  j js τ , weighted by labor expenses, 
(A4) can be simplified to: 
(A5a)      () s s






















= , and it also follows that: 













in which  s τ  is the average value of  j js τ , weighted by capital in place.  The assumption that the 
location of sales is independent of the location of production produces:   32






  In order to evaluate (A3) it is necessary to include an expression for  i Tax , for which it is 
helpful to use the following approximation: 
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Applying (A5a-A5c) to (A6) produces: 
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In evaluating (A8) it is helpful to apply the firm’s first-order conditions for profit 


































, which in turn implies: 
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By a similar logic, the first order condition for the profit maximizing choice of  i K  is: 




































, τ τ π
τ
. 
Using the Cobb-Douglas production function in (7), and taking the ratio of (A9a) to (A9b) 
produces: 
































































Dividing both sides of (A8) by i iL w , and applying (A10) produces: 
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Equation (A12) is analogous to equation (8) for a setting in which tax obligations are determined 
by formulas; if a firm operates in only one state, then  i τ τ =  and (A12) is identical to equation 
(8). 
  Consider the case of a firm with operations in all 50 states, diversified so that no single 
state strongly affects the value of τ ; such a case maximizes the extent to which the 
apportionment formulas influence tax effects.  Differentiating both sides of (A12) with respect to 
i is τ  produces: 






























































































































.  By a similar calculation, 











































































While the values on the right sides of (A13) and (A14) are not identical, they are nonetheless 
approximately equal, given that  () γ
γ
− 1
is roughly equal to the ratio of capital’s share of total 
output to labor’s share, and that the low state tax rates (Table 1 reports a mean value of 0.063) 
imply that  1 M  does not differ greatly from  2 M .  The effect of tax changes on  i w  depends on 
whether marginal labor demanders are subject to formula apportionment, but it is reasonable to 
take the effects to be similar across taxes apportioned according to capital and labor shares.  
Consequently, tax effects are proportional to  i i i i s s τ τ + , which is the product of the local 
statutory tax rate and one minus the sales apportionment factor. 
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I II III IV V VI
Non‐Union Members
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Hourly wage 16.886 13.542 17.810 16.250 16.773 13.060
Corporate tax rate 0.063 0.069 0.065 0.078 0.062 0.068
Labor‐to‐capital ratio 0.194 0.131 0.147 0.097 0.199 0.132
Personal income tax rate 0.051 0.060 0.055 0.060 0.051 0.060
Sales tax rate 0.052 0.060 0.053 0.060 0.052 0.060
Age 38.452 38.000 41.068 41.000 38.136 37.000
Male dummy 0.590 1.000 0.718 1.000 0.574 1.000
Married dummy 0.606 1.000 0.654 1.000 0.600 1.000
White dummy 0.844 1.000 0.818 1.000 0.848 1.000
Black dummy 0.099 0.000 0.133 0.000 0.095 0.000
Asian dummy 0.047 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.048 0.000
Native American dummy 0.009 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.009 0.000
Years of education 13.407 13.000 12.812 12.000 13.481 13.000
Union member dummy 0.108 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
Non‐profit dummy 0.068 0.000 0.061 0.000 0.069 0.000
Metro‐area dummy 0.831 1.000 0.823 1.000 0.833 1.000















weight provided by the CPS.    38
Variable I II III IV
Corporate tax rate 0.7502 0.6119 0.7203
(0.5456) (0.3099) (0.5486)




LK ratio * union ‐0.5454 ‐0.5468 ‐0.3574
(0.1016) (0.0953) (0.0903)






Union member 0.1747 0.3063 0.3057 0.2568
(0.0103) (0.0332) (0.0323) (0.0293)
Age 0.0384 0.0409 0.0409 0.0384
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0017)
Age‐squared / 1000 ‐0.3886 ‐0.4147 ‐0.4150 ‐0.3894
(0.0179) (0.0189) (0.0195) (0.0180)
Male dummy 0.1161 0.1156 0.1157 0.1164
(0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0059)
Married dummy 0.0016 0.0050 0.0050 0.0022
(0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0068) (0.0063)
Male * married dummy 0.1152 0.1229 0.1228 0.1152
(0.0074) (0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0074)
White dummy 0.0522 0.0607 0.0620 0.0505
(0.0179) (0.0178) (0.0187) (0.0169)
Black dummy ‐0.0631 ‐0.0554 ‐0.0541 ‐0.0627
(0.0209) (0.0204) (0.0210) (0.0200)
Asian dummy 0.0057 0.0022 0.0019 0.0036
(0.0191) (0.0181) (0.0198) (0.0185)
Years of education 0.0585 0.0640 0.0640 0.0584
(0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0013)
Non‐profit dummy 0.0105 ‐0.0484 ‐0.0486 0.0092
(0.0115) (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0110)
Metro‐area dummy 0.1468 0.1485 0.1505 0.1444
(0.0126) (0.0117) (0.0132) (0.0107)
Industry dummies Yes No No Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.4857 0.4587 0.4586 0.4871















IV include 46 industry dummy variables.    39









Union member 0.1542 0.2699 0.2208
(0.0097) (0.0263) (0.0247)
Age 0.0376 0.0401 0.0376
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0015)
Age‐squared / 1000 ‐0.3797 ‐0.4054 ‐0.3800
(0.0174) (0.0189) (0.0165)
Male dummy 0.1160 0.1154 0.1160
(0.0058) (0.0062) (0.0060)
Married dummy 0.0077 0.0105 0.0078
(0.0056) (0.0063) (0.0055)
Male * married dummy 0.1130 0.1206 0.1128
(0.0068) (0.0072) (0.0071)
White dummy 0.0373 0.0451 0.0370
(0.0132) (0.0142) (0.0131)
Black dummy ‐0.0763 ‐0.0702 ‐0.0761
(0.0144) (0.0152) (0.0147)
Asian dummy ‐0.0401 ‐0.0384 ‐0.0398
(0.0162) (0.0177) (0.0166)
Years of education 0.0582 0.0638 0.0582
(0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0015)
Non‐profit dummy 0.0085 ‐0.0463 0.0088
(0.0100) (0.0095) (0.0102)
Metro‐area dummy 0.1034 0.1067 0.1036
(0.0099) (0.0110) (0.0099)
Industry dummies Yes No Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.5017 0.4742 0.5021
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I II III
Variable Union Non‐Union Whole Sample








LK ratio * union * corp tax 4.3105 0.7422 3.9811
(1.2740) (0.4481) (1.2747)
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Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.3621 0.4670 0.4603
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Variable I Variable II
Low‐tax dummy 0.0073
(0.0391)




High‐tax * union ‐ 0.0924 High‐tax * union ‐ 0.1385
(0.0240) (0.0297)
Labor‐to‐capital ratio ‐0.1743 Labor‐to‐capital ratio ‐0.1862
(0.0128) (0.0245)




LK ratio * union * high‐tax 0.0778 LK ratio * union * high‐tax 0.4161
(0.0672) (0.0792)
Pers income tax rate 0.1689 Pers income tax rate ‐0.0984
(0.5701) (0.7879)
Sales tax rate ‐0.0088 Sales tax rate ‐0.1629
(0.7631) (1.6198)
Union member 0.2405 Union member 0.2880
(0.0136) (0.0213)
Age 0.0408 Age 0.0406
(0.0017) (0.0019)
Age‐squared / 1000 ‐0.4141 Age‐squared / 1000 ‐0.4075
(0.0193) (0.0214)
Male 0.1155 Male 0.1156
(0.0062) (0.0105)
Married 0.0052 Married 0.0112
(0.0070) (0.0102)
Male * married 0.1225 Male * married 0.1102
(0.0070) (0.0118)
White 0.0573 White 0.0319
(0.0168) (0.0337)
Black ‐0.0568 Black ‐0.0757
(0.0201) (0.0364)
Asian ‐0.0014 Asian ‐0.0431
(0.0182) (0.0388)
Years of education 0.0637 Years of education 0.0652
(0.0016) (0.0019)
Non‐profit ‐0.0497 Non‐profit ‐0.0485
(0.0099) (0.0111)
Metro‐area 0.1506 Metro‐area 0.1480
(0.0104) (0.0183)
































































Corporate tax rate ‐0.6762 0.6543 0.2679
(0.8109) (0.6699) (0.4639)




Labor‐to‐capital ratio ‐0.1607 ‐0.1784 ‐0.1743
(0.0156) (0.0173) (0.0119)








Pers income tax rate 0.6334 ‐0.9363 ‐0.3754
(0.6610) (0.6567) (0.4946)
Sales tax rate ‐0.1097 0.4596 0.2099
(2.0402) (0.6171) (0.6573)






Age 0.0387 0.0420 0.0405
(0.0015) (0.0024) (0.0017)
Age‐squared / 1000 ‐0.3951 ‐0.4251 ‐0.4101
(0.0172) (0.0265) (0.0184)
Male 0.1197 0.1134 0.1151
(0.0104) (0.0073) (0.0062)
Married 0.0088 0.0060 0.0079
(0.0081) (0.0095) (0.0065)
Male * married 0.1255 0.1187 0.1221
(0.0137) (0.0074) (0.0075)
White 0.0599 0.0622 0.0647
(0.0230) (0.0231) (0.0185)
Black ‐0.0701 ‐0.0308 ‐0.0409
(0.0254) (0.0235) (0.0200)
Asian ‐0.0260 0.0062 ‐0.0010
(0.0359) (0.0221) (0.0200)
Years of education 0.0586 0.0662 0.0636
(0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Non‐profit ‐0.0373 ‐0.0611 ‐0.0510
(0.0142) (0.0127) (0.0106)
Metro‐area 0.1383 0.1434 0.1375
(0.0154) (0.0130) (0.0105)
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes
Right‐to‐work dummy No No Yes
R
2 0.4390 0.4664 0.4631































































Labor‐to‐capital ratio ‐0.1619 ‐0.1769 ‐0.1729
(0.0156) (0.0182) (0.0122)














Age 0.0381 0.0417 0.0401
(0.0015) (0.0024) (0.0017)
Age‐squared / 1000 ‐0.3888 ‐0.4199 ‐0.4058
(0.0171) (0.0269) (0.0184)
Male 0.1206 0.1124 0.1153
(0.0098) (0.0073) (0.0059)
Married 0.0114 0.0101 0.0106
(0.0073) (0.0087) (0.0060)
Male * married 0.1238 0.1179 0.1206
(0.0136) (0.0077) (0.0073)
White 0.0580 0.0369 0.0451
(0.0205) (0.0200) (0.0147)
Black ‐0.0791 ‐0.0625 ‐0.0703
(0.0211) (0.0210) (0.0159)
Asian ‐0.0443 ‐0.0416 ‐0.0384
(0.0338) (0.0212) (0.0173)
Years of education 0.0591 0.0663 0.0637
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0017)
Non‐profit ‐0.0273 ‐0.0583 ‐0.0463
(0.0139) (0.0123) (0.0096)
Metro‐area 0.1164 0.1004 0.1065
(0.0151) (0.0134) (0.0103)
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes
Right‐to‐work dummy No No Yes
State dummies Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.4479 0.4771 0.4744
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Variable I II III IV
Corporate tax rate 0.2592 0.2853 0.2581 0.2750
(0.4536) (0.4699) (0.4417) (0.4567)
Corp tax rate * union ‐0.7933 ‐1.0042 ‐0.5592 ‐0.7001
(0.4213) (0.3795) (0.3489) (0.3564)
Labor‐to‐capital ratio ‐0.1741 ‐0.1741
(0.0117) (0.0126)
LK ratio * union ‐0.5419 ‐0.5430 ‐0.3597 ‐0.3608
(0.0917) (0.0917) (0.0895) (0.0910)
LK ratio * union * corp tax 4.1355 4.1065 2.5781 2.5626
(1.1197) (1.1303) (1.1437) (1.1621)
Pers income tax rate ‐0.3628 ‐0.3630 ‐0.3281 ‐0.3279
(0.4574) (0.4921) (0.4738) (0.4661)
Sales tax rate 0.2082 0.2070 0.2017 0.2011
(0.6090) (0.6048) (0.6513) (0.6287)
Union member 0.2574 0.2820 0.2183 0.2347
(0.0332) (0.0273) (0.0281) (0.0264)
Right‐to‐work ‐0.0869 ‐0.0833 ‐0.0820 ‐0.0797
(0.0197) (0.0200) (0.0189) (0.0175)
Union * right‐to‐work 0.0398 0.0266
(0.0187) (0.0169)
Age 0.0404 0.0404 0.0380 0.0380
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Age‐squared / 1000 ‐0.4096 ‐0.4097 ‐0.3846 ‐0.3847
(0.0189) (0.0184) (0.0174) (0.0172)
Male 0.1152 0.1151 0.1162 0.1162
(0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0060) (0.0059)
Married 0.0079 0.0078 0.0050 0.0050
(0.0069) (0.0063) (0.0060) (0.0058)
Male * married 0.1220 0.1222 0.1145 0.1146
(0.0074) (0.0068) (0.0074) (0.0073)
White 0.0649 0.0647 0.0548 0.0547
(0.0186) (0.0179) (0.0178) (0.0178)
Black ‐0.0405 ‐0.0409 ‐0.0483 ‐0.0486
(0.0199) (0.0193) (0.0199) (0.0192)
Asian ‐0.0012 ‐0.0012 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0197) (0.0190) (0.0198) (0.0191)
Years of education 0.0636 0.0636 0.0581 0.0581
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Non‐profit ‐0.0509 ‐0.0509 0.0058 0.0059
(0.0104) (0.0102) (0.0108) (0.0106)
Metro‐area 0.1374 0.1373 0.1339 0.1339
(0.0104) (0.0094) (0.0100) (0.0099)
Industry dummies No No Yes Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Right‐to‐work dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.4631 0.4630 0.4910 0.4909
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Variable I II III
Corporate tax rate * (1‐ sales weight) 0.4379 0.5381 0.4236
(0.8200) (0.6357) (0.7752)




LK ratio * union ‐0.4512 ‐0.4497 ‐0.3252
(0.1001) (0.0937) (0.0746)






Union member 0.2775 0.2790 0.2377
(0.0228) (0.0236) (0.0184)
Age 0.0409 0.0409 0.0384
(0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0016)
Age‐squared/1000 ‐0.4143 ‐0.4141 ‐0.3890
(0.0187) (0.0194) (0.0173)
Male dummy 0.1155 0.1154 0.1164
(0.0061) (0.0063) (0.0058)
Married dummy 0.0049 0.0050 0.0022
(0.0067) (0.0070) (0.0061)
Male * married dummy 0.1225 0.1226 0.1148
(0.0072) (0.0073) (0.0074)
White dummy 0.0633 0.0640 0.0530
(0.0179) (0.0178) (0.0168)
Black dummy ‐0.0537 ‐0.0534 ‐0.0611
(0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0199)
Asian dummy 0.0023 0.0042 0.0036
(0.0195) (0.0206) (0.0184)
Years of education 0.0641 0.0641 0.0585
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0013)
Non‐profit dummy ‐0.0474 ‐0.0473 0.0105
(0.0102) (0.0110) (0.0106)
Metro‐area dummy 0.1508 0.1516 0.1465
(0.0113) (0.0132) (0.0108)
Industry dummies No No Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes
R‐Squared 0.4579 0.4578 0.4864
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I II III IV V VI VII VIII
High‐Tax & Non‐Union
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Hourly wage 17.512 16.400 16.419 12.667 17.702 15.850 18.489 14.545
Corporate tax rate 0.015 0.022 0.011 0.000 0.094 0.090 0.094 0.095
Labor‐to‐capital ratio 0.121 0.095 0.188 0.131 0.180 0.097 0.208 0.142
Pers income tax rate 0.023 0.034 0.016 0.000 0.062 0.069 0.061 0.065
Sales tax rate 0.059 0.060 0.058 0.063 0.052 0.060 0.053 0.060
Age 41.200 41.000 37.833 37.000 41.547 41.000 38.715 38.000
Male dummy 0.740 1.000 0.605 1.000 0.679 1.000 0.560 1.000
Married dummy 0.669 1.000 0.617 1.000 0.639 1.000 0.596 1.000
White dummy 0.825 1.000 0.872 1.000 0.835 1.000 0.876 1.000
Black dummy 0.145 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.120 0.000 0.071 0.000
Asian dummy 0.019 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.050 0.000
Native American dummy 0.011 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000
Years of education 12.709 12.000 13.296 13.000 12.965 12.000 13.847 14.000
Union member dummy 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
Non‐profit dummy 0.061 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.084 0.000 0.086 0.000
Metro‐area dummy 0.788 1.000 0.824 1.000 0.862 1.000 0.852 1.000
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I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Hourly wage 16.144 12.500 18.219 14.400 18.970 15.850 21.009 16.825
Union hourly wage 15.538 15.000 16.660 14.400 19.519 20.000 18.401 16.325
Nonunion hourly wage 16.175 12.459 18.411 14.400 18.842 15.000 21.560 16.988
Corporate tax rate 0.011 0.000 0.094 0.095 0.014 0.022 0.094 0.090
Labor to capital ratio 0.400 0.298 0.424 0.298 0.028 0.025 0.027 0.026
Pers income tax rate 0.016 0.000 0.060 0.065 0.021 0.034 0.061 0.065
Sales tax rate 0.059 0.063 0.052 0.060 0.058 0.060 0.052 0.060
Age 37.313 36.000 38.974 38.000 39.317 39.000 39.352 39.000
Male dummy 0.457 0.000 0.426 0.000 0.677 1.000 0.624 1.000
Married dummy 0.592 1.000 0.560 1.000 0.657 1.000 0.627 1.000
White dummy 0.844 1.000 0.843 1.000 0.871 1.000 0.876 1.000
Black dummy 0.105 0.000 0.098 0.000 0.086 0.000 0.070 0.000
Asian dummy 0.045 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.050 0.000
Native American dummy 0.006 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.004 0.000
Years of education 13.799 14.000 14.307 14.000 13.389 13.000 13.873 14.000
Union member dummy 0.048 0.000 0.110 0.000 0.188 0.000 0.177 0.000
Non‐profit dummy 0.139 0.000 0.202 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.008 0.000
Metro‐area dummy 0.847 1.000 0.871 1.000 0.786 1.000 0.832 1.000
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Variable I II III IV
Corporate tax rate ‐0.1025 ‐0.2068 ‐0.1200
(0.6200) (0.3721) (0.6029)




LK ratio * union ‐0.5358 ‐0.5357 ‐0.3537
(0.0919) (0.0844) (0.0893)






Union member 0.1594 0.2779 0.2774 0.2296
(0.0097) (0.0290) (0.0273) (0.0266)
Age 0.0378 0.0402 0.0402 0.0377
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0016)
Age‐squared / 1000 ‐0.3826 ‐0.4072 ‐0.4072 ‐0.3819
(0.0173) (0.0190) (0.0182) (0.0171)
Male dummy 0.1160 0.1150 0.1150 0.1158
(0.0059) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0060)
Married dummy 0.0068 0.0098 0.0098 0.0071
(0.0057) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0058)
Male * married dummy 0.1142 0.1220 0.1219 0.1141
(0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0074) (0.0074)
White dummy 0.0471 0.0554 0.0552 0.0460
(0.0144) (0.0152) (0.0155) (0.0144)
Black dummy ‐0.0574 ‐0.0507 ‐0.0513 ‐0.0578
(0.0146) (0.0159) (0.0161) (0.0146)
Asian dummy ‐0.0237 ‐0.0255 ‐0.0263 ‐0.0243
(0.0179) (0.0186) (0.0208) (0.0171)
Years of education 0.0582 0.0638 0.0637 0.0582
(0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0015)
Non‐profit dummy 0.0039 ‐0.0511 ‐0.0511 0.0044
(0.0099) (0.0094) (0.0100) (0.0101)
Metro‐area dummy 0.1266 0.1297 0.1301 0.1258
(0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0122) (0.0111)
Industry dummies Yes No No Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.4929 0.4652 0.4652 0.4934
















divisions. Columns I and IV include 46 industry dummy variables.    55
I II III
Variable Union Non‐Union Whole Sample






LK ratio * union * corp tax 3.1200 0.3935 2.4097
(1.0653) (0.3843) (1.2444)

















































   56












Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.4111 0.4957 0.4884
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Variable I Variable II
Low‐tax dummy 0.0043
(0.0347)




High‐tax * union ‐ 0.0779 High‐tax * union ‐ 0.0985
(0.0198) (0.0260)




LK ratio * union * high‐tax 0.0230 LK ratio * union * high‐tax 0.2355
(0.0726) (0.0836)
Pers income tax rate 0.1667 Pers income tax rate ‐0.1159
(0.5103) (0.8039)
Sales tax rate ‐0.0020 Sales tax rate ‐0.2258
(0.7651) (1.6530)
Union member 0.2119 Union member 0.2326
(0.0126) (0.0182)
Age 0.0384 Age 0.0382
(0.0016) (0.0018)
Age‐squared / 1000 ‐0.3889 Age‐squared / 1000 ‐0.3830
(0.0179) (0.0205)
Male 0.1162 Male 0.1224
(0.0061) (0.0086)
Married 0.0025 Married 0.0092
(0.0066) (0.0105)
Male * married 0.1148 Male * married 0.1007
(0.0074) (0.0110)
White 0.0474 White 0.0219
(0.0157) (0.0313)
Black ‐0.0639 Black ‐0.0851
(0.0187) (0.0342)
Asian 0.0002 Asian ‐0.0391
(0.0188) (0.0367)
Years of education 0.0581 Years of education 0.0589
(0.0013) (0.0015)
Non‐profit 0.0080 Non‐profit ‐0.0033
(0.0107) (0.0151)
Metro‐area 0.1462 Metro‐area 0.1457
(0.0109) (0.0171)
Industry dummies Yes Industry dummies Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Occupation dummies Yes
R
2 0.4882 R‐Squared 0.4921
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I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Hourly wage 15.696 12.000 14.810 12.500 17.671 14.550 18.607 15.000
Union hourly wage 15.384 13.840 17.153 16.150 18.648 17.640 17.734 15.789
Nonunion hourly wage 15.719 12.000 14.467 12.000 17.469 14.000 18.755 14.956
Corporate tax rate 0.005 0.000 0.101 0.101 0.020 0.022 0.094 0.090
Labor to capital ratio 0.188 0.131 0.190 0.115 0.170 0.108 0.205 0.132
Pers income tax rate 0.007 0.000 0.090 0.090 0.029 0.034 0.059 0.064
Sales tax rate 0.058 0.063 0.050 0.050 0.058 0.060 0.053 0.060
Age 37.607 37.000 38.491 38.000 39.018 39.000 39.162 39.000
Male dummy 0.618 1.000 0.573 1.000 0.623 1.000 0.577 1.000
Married dummy 0.623 1.000 0.651 1.000 0.622 1.000 0.599 1.000
White dummy 0.850 1.000 0.965 1.000 0.890 1.000 0.864 1.000
Black dummy 0.106 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.081 0.000
Asian dummy 0.036 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.051 0.000
Native American dummy 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.004 0.000
Years of education 12.965 12.000 13.304 13.000 13.581 13.000 13.748 13.000
Union member dummy 0.069 0.000 0.135 0.000 0.170 0.000 0.145 0.000
Non‐profit dummy 0.048 0.000 0.106 0.000 0.072 0.000 0.085 0.000
Metro‐area dummy 0.835 1.000 0.540 1.000 0.798 1.000 0.874 1.000





































Corporate tax rate ‐0.5425 0.6116 0.2649
(0.7473) (0.6601) (0.4449)












Pers income tax rate 0.5787 ‐0.8432 ‐0.3379
(0.6031) (0.6812) (0.4558)
Sales tax rate ‐0.0102 0.4319 0.2033
(2.0881) (0.6209) (0.6019)






Age 0.0368 0.0392 0.0380
(0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0016)
Age‐squared / 1000 ‐0.3746 ‐0.3959 ‐0.3850
(0.0157) (0.0265) (0.0175)
Male 0.1178 0.1158 0.1162
(0.0110) (0.0066) (0.0057)
Married 0.0067 0.0028 0.0051
(0.0088) (0.0078) (0.0059)
Male * married 0.1168 0.1126 0.1145
(0.0142) (0.0070) (0.0073)
White 0.0537 0.0508 0.0547
(0.0213) (0.0218) (0.0174)
Black ‐0.0713 ‐0.0433 ‐0.0486
(0.0231) (0.0230) (0.0186)
Asian ‐0.0237 0.0074 0.0004
(0.0320) (0.0234) (0.0185)
Years of education 0.0536 0.0599 0.0580
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0014)
Non‐profit 0.0172 ‐0.0054 0.0057
(0.0188) (0.0113) (0.0105)
Metro‐area 0.1389 0.1358 0.1340
(0.0139) (0.0130) (0.0094)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes
Right‐to‐work dummy No No Yes
R
2 0.4699 0.4945 0.4910
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Note: The regression reported in Column I includes observations of only 
those individuals living in states with right‐to‐work laws. The regression 
reported in Column II includes observations of only those individuals 
living in states without right‐to‐work laws. The regression reported in 
Column III includes the whole sample and adds a right‐to‐work dummy 
and interaction terms with the right‐to‐work dummy. The right‐to‐work 
dummy equals one if an individual lives in a state with a right‐to‐work 
law. The dependent variable is the log of hourly wages. The corporate tax 
rate is defined as the marginal state corporate tax rate for the highest 
income bracket adjusted to allow for the deductibility of federal 
corporate taxes. The labor‐to‐capital ratio is defined as salaries and wages 
divided by total assets as reported on federal corporate tax returns. The 
individual income tax rate is the marginal state individual income tax rate 
for the highest income tax bracket. The sales tax rate is the tax rate 
imposed on general sales. The union member dummy equals one if an 
individual is a union member or is covered by a union contract. The non‐
profit dummy equals one if an individual works for a nonprofit 
organization. The metro‐area dummy equals one if an individual lives in a 
metropolitan area. The columns report estimated OLS coefficients; 
standard errors are bootstrapped (1,000 replications) and clustered at the 
state level. All regressions include dummy variables for 22 occupations 
and 46 industries.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 